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 The authoritarian regimes in interwar Europe were not traditional dictatorships, merely 
imposed from above on an immobile and passive society. On the contrary: their emergence, 
installation and consolidation came about due to the mobilisation of different social groups 
who, through their actions and perceptions, constituted and gave life to the new states. That is 
why, in order to understand their true nature and the reasons behind their creation and 
consolidation, we need to analyse the interaction between those regimes and the societies in 
which they took root. 
In our view, as regards internal factors, the stabilisat on and later consolidation of 
Franco’s regime can be explained by the interpenetration of society and the institutions of the 
“New State” in three overlapping areas. Firstly, in the sphere of the shared and unifying 
culture of the community of Civil War victors, forged by means of the construction of a 
sublimated imaginary. This imaginary was founded on two great myths: that of victory, which 
conferred a regenerative and sacred nature on the military struggle, and that of the 
Refundación Nacional (National Refoundation), which granted the dictatori l regime that 
arose from the Civil War a new stage of glory and splendour, built on the ruins of the 
“ignominious” Republican experience. Secondly, as rega ds repression, which had the 
decisive collaboration of those supporting Francoism and that would destroy any possible 
opposition on the part of their potential enemies. Francoism would proclaim itself to be the 
new political order that would return the nation its lost greatness and would bring relentless 
justice to enemies of the “Fatherland” (“Patria”). The dehumanised image of the vanquished 
that the dictatorship managed to impose came together with the heralding of a new era in 
which there would only be space for the religious, Catholic and spiritualised values of the 
Eternal Fatherland. We think that this set of idealisations supported the creation of a new 
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emotional climate of identification with the new regime’s essential aims, while it probably 
contributed to the adoption by many Spaniards of an attitude of adhesion to, and even loyal 
cooperation with, the “New State” and its repressive organs.1 Thirdly and finally, in the 
socioeconomic sphere, where those making up the groups supporting the “New State” would 
see their personal interests fulfilled, while the defeated would be enclosed in a maze of misery 
and silence, abandoning any political concerns and co centrating on survival. 
 It is commonly accepted nowadays that, as with other interwar authoritarian regimes, 
Francoism enjoyed a broad consensus among the populati n.2 However, as in other European 
cases, the population’s attitudes were not divided in a Manichean or bipolar way between 
consensus and dissent.3 There was a broad range of behaviour, from unconditi al agreement 
to support with some moral or political disagreements, to acceptance, to passiveness, to 
demobilisation, to accommodation, to dissent shown in the private sphere and even direct 
opposition to the regime.4 However, as we propose in this work, Francoism’s policies would 
manage to achieve stability for the regime, ensuring support among a heterogeneous set of 
social groups, as well as eliminating any signs of opposition from the dissidents’ side. 
Furthermore, we maintain that the consent which the regime enjoyed among a large section of 
the population existed alongside the depoliticisation and repression of possible opponents, and 
their forced withdrawal to the interior sphere of activity in search of support that would allow 
them to survive the terrible economic conditions of the post-war period. Therefore, it is 
impossible to understand Francoism without the terms “consent” and “repression”, which 
were not opposites, but a consequence of each other: both would be present in the 
interconnection between the regime’s institutions ad society, in the active participation of the 
victors in the work of repression, as well as the punishment meted out by these to the 
vanquished. 
 It is in the local sphere, in viewpoints “from below”, where we can most vividly see 
the interaction between the regime and society taking place. With this perspective, we focus 
our study on the south of Spain: we assess the emerg nce of a “culture of victory” in different 
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Andalusian cities of the Francoist rearguard during the Civil War. Then, already focussing on 
different locations and provinces in eastern Andalusi  (see Map 1), we attempt to show that 
this culture was a key element in creating a “national community”. This is to be done firstly 
through the analysis of Francoist repression and the participation in this of the victors and, 
secondly, through the application of an autarchical political economy that punished the 
defeated and acted in the interests of the victors. By means of this approach to the local, the 
links existing between local realities and the regional and national political reality can be 
brought into relief. It is in the interaction between these spheres that the Francoist regime got 




The “cultural community” of the victors 
 
The Imaginary centred on the Civil War and the construction of an ultra-nationalist Francoist 
identity.  
 
 From the very beginning of the 1936-1939 war, the rebels built up a great arsenal of 
mytholigised stories and imaginaries. The imaginaries were created to justify the “uprising” 
and were intended to grant meaning to their own Fascisti ed, anti-Republican and anti-
democratic political project. The sublimated idealis t on of the Civil War by the rebel group 
was wrapped in a collection of cultural, mythical and symbolic components, imported from 
the most refined traditions of the anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarian right5. During the 
conflict, all these discourses6, myths and symbols would end up becoming cornerstone  f the 
legitimising ideology of the Francoist “New State”. 
 The importance of the historical construction of the Fascistised and anti-democratic 
right’s political languages and the propaganda messages over the course of the Civil War can 
be understood much better by using a “culturalist” approach. We view as unavoidable the 
dissection of the discursive components and the intrpretative agencies that modelled the 
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individual and collective behaviour of those supporting the dictatorial regime installed after 
the defeat of democracy during the Civil War. The all gorical and sublimated recreation of 
the war created by the rebels was manifested throug a dense sedimentation of discursive 
recreations and metanarratives with a strongly mythogenic capacity. Almost all these 
elements, with their idealised and symbolic nature, powerfully contributed to building the 
perceptions by which the individual or group actors interpreted the conflict’s nature or 
justified the unavoidable use of extreme violence against an enemy designated as perverse and 
inhuman. It is clear that subjectivity and perceptions condition individual decisions and 
actions. Furthermore, social imaginaries define andorder the way in which actors perceive, 
codify and interpret the reality that surrounds them, giving meaning to their perception of 
experiences and allowing them to have a personalised understanding of “their world”7. All 
this, then, acquires a special meaning if we accept the premise that the individual and group 
actors carry out their own decisions profoundly influenced by a dense network of highly 
idealised mental recreations and cultural perceptions, which, in each case, takes a specific 
linguistic and conceptual formulation8. 
 The dehumanising images of the leftist enemy and the discourses discrediting the 
Republic came together in the midst of the climate of terror, death and revenge that took over 
in the rebel rearguard, in an exalted interpretation of the 1936-1939 conflict. Once the “New 
State” was in place throughout the national territory, the complex mixture of symbols, 
imaginaries, languages and cults that extolled the war’s regenerative nature allowed the 
creation of the myth of the Nation’s sacred sacrifice and the salvation and purification granted 
by death. The sum of all these imaginaries, given a strong emotive and mythogenic charge, 
managed to invest the Francoist regime with a sanctified and regenerative halo. The idealised 
vision that identified Francoism as the starting point f a glorious stage in the resurgence of 
the Fatherland became a powerful instrument used by the dictatorship to instil trust and 
support among an extensive and mixed range of individuals and social groups. It was this 
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large part of the population that played a decisive rol  both in the aid given when it came to 
repressive violence against the vanquished and in the maintenance of the dictatorial “New 
State”.  
In short, Francoism was built on an idealised reconstruction of the war and the victory 
that achieved a very probable capacity to seduce and persuade the upper classes, of course, 
but also intermediate and even popular social groups that were most harmed by the strikes and 
social upheaval of the Republican years, by the overturn of traditional and religious values, or 
by the excesses of the revolution carried out in the Republican rearguard during the Civil 
War. This mythified reconstruction was based on a regenerative image of the war; on the 
myth of victory against the Fatherland’s enemies, represented by the “abominable” 
democratic regime of the Second Republic; and an extensive programme of re-Catholicisation 
and re-establishment of the traditional Spain. Through the construction of the myths of victory 
(over the enemies of Eternal Spain) and of the Refounding of the Nation (carried out after the 
war), Francoism favoured the modelling of a culture of identity among the victors, carving out 
a stereotyped and accusatory image of the “pernicious” Republican experience and 
contributing to forging a specific anti-democratic memory. 
 
The anti-left Imaginary and the gestation of anti-Republican memory. 
 
 The key ideas that acted as founding elements of the victors’ ideological cohesion 
underwent an accelerated process of bias and stylisation over the course of the war. The 
military confrontation was conceived as the supreme and definitive attack necessary to 
exterminate that monstrous enemy –the anti-Spain– that threatened the Fatherland. The 
military victory over the enemies of the native land would put an end, once and for all, to a 
prolonged decadence of the national spirit which had been underway since, at least, the first 
construction of the liberal State at the beginning of the 19th century. This process of moral 
degeneration was seen as having intensified to an intolerable pace with the arrival of the 
Republican regime and its insidious permissiveness and unacceptable collusion with the 
growth and spread of the Republican, Marxist and anarchist lefts. From this perspective, those 
responsible for such a reprehensible phenomenon of national neglect should be definitively 
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exterminated by applying extreme and “purifying” violence, such as that triggered by the 
1936 “glorious uprising”9. 
 The anti-leftist and dehumanising discourse regarding the enemy that was conceived 
in the rebel rearguard centred on the constant discrediting of the labour movement, 
Republican and even liberal ideologies. This discourse bestowed on all these ideologies 
disproportionate and debasing labels, attributing to them powerful and imaginary forces that 
conspired in a contemptible way against the Hispanicist essentialism firmly rooted in the 
traditions of Catholicism, patriotism, hierarchy and defence of the race. According to this 
viewpoint, the left-wing movements and democratic republicanism were the incarnation of the 
anti-Spain10.  
 The revolution that broke out in the Republican rearguard during the early months of 
the conflict was worthy of close attention in the cultural construction of the discourse 
dehumanising and discrediting the left-wing. The popular revolution was presented as a 
horrendous phenomenon of moral degradation and of absolute loss of the values most purely 
cultivated by the spirit of Catholicism and Spanish nationalism. The Civil War became the 
inevitable historical event that was to return to the Spanish nation its ancestral greatness and 
spiritual purity, violently usurped by the most extr me manifestations of left-wing 
revolution11. The anti-leftist discourse conceived by the rebels contained at least some of the 
following elements. 
 Firstly, in almost all the literature linked to the events taking place in parts of the 
Republican rearguard, there is a distorted description of the socioeconomic transformations 
that were disturbing those areas. On many occasions it was concluded that the totality of those 
revolutionary changes meant, above all, an abominable and caricature-like imitation of Soviet 
communist forms of social organisation and expressions of centralised economic planning12. 
 Secondly, the left-wing’s domination of “loyal” territories in the Republican rearguard 
meant a painful aggravation of the accelerated historical process of moral degradation and 
national ruin. The “red domination” of those territo es which had not been quickly 
“liberated” exacerbated a whole series of perverted values and a range of anti-patriotic forms 
                                                
9 See ‘La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el Movimiento (Tetuán, 21 de julio de 1936)’, in ABC 
de Sevilla, 23-7-1936; and Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena: ‘Cara a la Nueva España’, in ABC de Sevilla, 9-9-1936. 
10 See Ideal, “Contra quiénes luchamos”, 5-8-1936. See also: “La contrarrevolución”, by Álvaro Alcalá Galiano, 
in ABC de Sevilla. 
11 See: “La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el movimiento”, in ABC de Sevilla, 23-7-1936. 
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of behaviour in the heart of local government bodies and municipal institutions. Such values 
and types of behaviour were found to be tinged withthe meanness, avarice and materialism of 
their perpetrators, who were seen as responsible for the most profound degradations possible 
in social, spiritual and cultural life13.  
 Thirdly and lastly, the “frenzied anti-clericalism” that took place in practically all the 
population centres in the “loyal” rearguard, was considered to be one of the most prominent 
features of the degenerate and degraded character attributed to the left-wing and the “enemies 
of Spain”. For the political languages and discourse that were being structured in “nationalist” 
Spain, the left-wing as a whole was exclusively responsible for the most varied enactments of 
iconoclasm, sacrophobia and immense and collective hat for the sacred, which spread like 
wildfire in the summer of 1936. The anti-clerical violence must be understood as the sudden 
and spontaneous expression of a profound desire to cut to the roots the old, unjust and 
hierarchical order that had traditionally been supported by the Catholic Church and its 
representatives. For that very reason, on many occasions this expression occurred by means of 
a destructive and cathartic action, inspired by the mystical belief in the virtues of purifying 
fire and the salvation of death as necessary tools f r building a new socio-moral order14. It 
had a greater effect as propaganda to blame the left-wing for the “atrocities” of “frenzied” 
anti-clericalism triggered in the towns in the “loyal” rearguard. In this way, these actions were 
presented as an unrestrained storm of anti-Catholic hate, which jeopardised the purest 
ancestral values upon which was constructed the Spanish essentialism found among a very 
large proportion of the population15. 
  
Civil War myths and the spiritualised exaltation of the Nation 
 
 In the feverish and suffocating climate of destruction, terror and death that suddenly 
overtook the mass confrontation that began in 1936, there was also room for discursive 
constructions favourable to the deified exaltation of violence, the dehumanising satanisation 
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of the enemy and the sacralisation of the regenerativ  potential of wars, following in the wake 
of the mythogenous and visionary politics of Fascism16. Once the war was over, that 
sublimated interpretation of the missionary character bestowed on the conflict allowed the 
victors to see themselves as belonging to a kind of mythical community, forged in ties of 
blood and the glorious and sacred fight for the Regen ration of the Fatherland17.  
 The symbolic foundations of the discourse created by “nationalist Spain” converted 
the combatants fighting the Second Republic regime into true champions of an epic with 
profound ethical dimensions, focussed on the complete extermination of Spain’s enemies and 
on the establishment of the cultural, mystical and political bases on which the definitive 
“regeneration of the Hispanic race” would be erected18. What we shall call a “legitimising 
discourse” in terms of the conflict was based on the reuse of a vast amalgam of linguistic-
cultural elements, which were somehow present in a tradition of integrated, Catholic and 
reactionary nationalism with deep historical, ethical and political roots. In this regard, the 
stated discourse acted as a storehouse of the thought and intellectual tradition with anti-
modernist, reactionary, traditionalist, authoritarian and anti-liberal roots that had been 
evolving since the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries19. This discourse was 
finally invaded by the intellectual and cultural currents of Fascism, radical nationalism, 
Catholic traditionalism and anti-parliamentarianism. The Fatherland was reclaimed once 
again by the divine will, letting it play the sacrosanct role of spiritual and universal 
disseminator of Catholicism which it had been playing since time immemorial20. The war was 
designated as a landmark of colossal dimensions and tr sformatory prospects, through which 
the purest roots of Hispanic essentialism21 had been called once again to a titanic task of 
                                                                                                                                              
15 See Ideal-Jaen Edition, ‘Los vecinos de Arjona recuerdan aún co  horror los crímenes cometidos durante el 
dominio rojo’, 6-5-1939. Cf. ABC de Sevilla, “La columna del comandante Buiza toma Cazalla. El odio a la 
religión”, 15-8-1936. 
16 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 159-81 and ‘Toward a General Theory of Fascism’, in George L. Mosse, Masses and Man. 
Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality (New York: Howard Fertig, 1980), 159-96, 170-4. 
17 See Sergio Luzzatto, ‘The Political Culture of Fascist Italy’, Contemporary European History, 8, 2, 1999, 317-
34, 322-4; James A. Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals. Fascist Social and Political Thought (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 78-84. 
18 See Ideal, ‘Luces y resplandores de la Guerra’, 4-10-1936; ABC de Sevilla, ‘Discurso del Generalísimo Franco 
ante el micrófono de Radio Nacional’, 20-7-1937; and Antonio Gallego y Burín, Seis discursos y una 
conferencia (Granada: Talleres Tipográficos A. Márquez, 1937), 23-37. 
19 Pedro Cerezo Galán, El mal del siglo. El conflicto entre Ilustración y Romanticismo en la crisis finisecular del 
siglo XIX (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva and Universidad de Granada, 2003), 633-42. 
20 Eduardo González Calleja and Fredes Limón Nevado, La Hispanidad como instrumento de combate. Raza e 
imperio en la prensa franquista durante la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 31-45. 
21 See ‘El Frente Nacional’, by Francisco de Cossío, ABC de Sevilla, 11 September 1936. 
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ethical, mental and mystical regeneration22. To this must be added the vast process of creating 
a discourse full of symbolic components, confined to a powerful imaginary exalting the 
Eternal Nation, and installed on a mythified and allegorical paraphrasis. This paraphrasis, 
incorporating numerous Fascist components23 and which had millenarian and messianic 
features24 –some of them taken from traditional Catholic doctrine25–, perceived the timeless 
existence of a Fatherland immersed in a permanent cycle that reproduced the stages of 
Paradise, Fall and Redemption26. What the propagandists and ideologists of the nascent 
Francoist Spain did was nothing other than recover th  discourses, philosophical traditions 
and political cultures of neo-Hegelian idealism, essentialist nationalism27, Fascism and anti-
parliamentarian authoritarianism. Many of those comp nents were found to be available in 
the European anti-liberal intellectual storehouse28. 
 One contribution to the discourse was reasoning typical of populist ultra-nationalism 
and Fascism. The call was for the regenerative rejuvenation of the Nation and its erection on a 
new political order that would overcome liberalism29. It is worth highlighting the symbolism 
used when unravelling the historical roots that hadled to the outbreak of the Civil War. It was 
stated that the Spanish Nation had, in recent decades, been immersed in an irreversible 
process of decline. What was being evoked, then, was the simile of the infirm Nation, 
threatened (or assaulted) by an (internal or external) enemy, or by a multifarious range of 
                                                
22 See in this regard: ‘Cara a la Nueva España’, by Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, in ABC de Sevilla, 9 September 
1936; and ABC de Sevilla, ‘Discurso pronunciado por Pedro Sainz Rodríguez (Vicepresidente), en el transcurso 
del acto de Constitución del Instituto de España, celebrado en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Salamanca, el 6 
de enero de 1938’, 7 January 1938. 
23 Cf. Aristotle A. Kallis, ‘To Expand or Not to Expand? Territory, Generic Fascism and the Quest for an “Ideal 
Fatherland’’, Journal of Contemporary History, 38, 2 (2003), 244-6. 
24 See: Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 141-2; Box, ‘La tesis 
de la religión política’, 223-4; Richard Steigmann-Gall, El Reich sagrado. Concepciones nazis sobre el 
cristianismo, 1919-1945 (Madrid: Akal, 2007), 27-70; and, by the same author: ‘Apostasy or religiosity? The 
cultural meanings of the Protestant vote for Hitler’,  Social History, 25, 3 (2000), 279-84; see also John F. 
Pollard, ‘“Clerical Fascism”: Context, Overview and Conclusion’, Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions, 8, 2 (2007), 434-7. 
25 Isidro Gomá y Tomás, ‘Carta Pastoral sobre el sentido cristiano-español de la Guerra’, in Pastorales de la 
Guerra de España (Madrid: Rialp, Rivadeneyra, 1955). 
26 See Box, ‘Secularizando el Apocalipsis’, 151-2. See Manuel García Morente, Idea de la Hispanidad (Madrid: 
Espasa-Calpe, 1961), 15-22; and by the same author: ‘Ideas para una Filosofía de la Historia de España’, in Idea 
de la Hispanidad, 179-209 and ‘Raíces históricas del movimiento nacionalista’, in Obras Completas, vol. II, 
1937-1942, (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1996), 377-82. 
27 See Manuel García Morente, ‘España como estilo’, in Idea de la Hispanidad, 34-45.  
28 See Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, ‘La inflexión autoritaria del liberalismo español’, in Manuel Suárez 
Cortina, ed., Las máscaras de la libertad. El liberalismo español, 1808-1950 (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 434-
9 and 446-9. Consult Ismael Saz, España contra España, 82-6. 
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invasive and harmful agents that would besiege its unity and strength. To confront this 
process of debilitation, there was a call to eradicte the infiltrating agents (Marxism, atheism, 
Judaism, freemasonry, anti-clericalism, separatism, the regions’ nationalist or “anti-Spanish” 
feeling and even Soviet communism), and elements besieging the racial essences on which 
the Nation’s spiritual purity was based30. For all these reasons, both the military uprising 
against the Republic and the Civil War itself became phenomena interpreted as a memorable 
immolation in a group sacrifice imposed by God and i stalled upon an eschatological and 
sanctifying shedding of blood and death31. 
 The war, then, was presented as the collective historical endeavour to return to the 
Fatherland its damaged Catholic and traditionalist e sentialism. Victory over the enemy, 
achieved by means of the sacrifice provided by blood and death, was interpreted as an event 
saturated with mystical, millenarian and regenerative energies32. The conflict was the crucible 
from which a New Spain would emerge, born from the abolition of the decrepit liberal-
parliamentarian construction, and refounded and resuscitated thanks to the fusion of energies 
arising from its most noble and ancestral ideals33. The liberation movement and the violent 
response to the enemy became an enterprise that would necessarily be sustained by a 
heterogeneous set of social and professional groups, united in the defence of their common 





                                                                                                                                              
29 Roger Griffin, ‘Il nucleo palingenetico dell’ideologia del “fascismo generico”’, in Alessandro Campi, ed., Che 
cos´é il fascismo? (Rome: Ideazione Editrice, 2003), 97-122. See alsoRoger Griffin, ed., International fascism: 
theories, causes and the new consensus (London & New York: Arnold, Oxford University Press, 1998). 
30 Isidro Gomá y Tomás, El Caso de España. Instrucción a sus diocesanos y respuestas a unas preguntas sobre 
la guerra actual (Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1936), 20-1. 
31 Isidro Gomá y Tomás, “La Cuaresma de España. Carta Pastoral sobre el sentido cristiano-español de la 
guerra”, en Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Por Dios y por España, (Barcelona, Rafael Casulleras, Librero, 1940), pp. 
87-127 . 
32 See Ideal, ‘Luces y resplandores de la Guerra’, 4 October 1936. See also ABC de Sevilla, ‘Discurso del 
Generalísimo Franco ante el micrófono de Radio Nacional’, 20 July 1937; Ideal, ‘Granada celebra con esplendor 
el Día del Alzamiento. Discurso del Sr. Gallego Burín’, 19 July 1938, and Ideal, ‘La Bandera de la Victoria’, 15 
August 1936. Regarding the ‘mythic core’ of ‘generic fascism’, as well as the mythified idealisation of ‘national 
decadence’ and the mythogenous and regenerative component of its revolutionary and anti-democratic discourse, 
consult Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London & New York, Routledge, 1993), 26-43, and more 
recently Roger Griffin, ‘The Primacy of Culture: the Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within 
Fascist Studies’, Journal of Contemporary History, 37, 1 (2002), 37-43. 
33 Ideal, ‘Luces y resplandores de la Guerra’, 4 October 1936, and ‘La bandera de la victoria’, 15 August 1936. 
34 Ideal, ‘Santiago y ¡Viva España!’, 26 July 1936 and ‘Contra quiénes luchamos’, 5 August 1936. 
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The “culture of victory” 
 
The Civil War changed everything. As we have pointed out, it would be seen as a 
providential, mythical and regenerative event. The “Crusade” was understood as the decisive 
moment when Spain would be reborn from its ashes, bcoming once again what it had been, 
purified by the blood of true Spaniards. After 1 April 1939, the war would not be forgotten, 
but would become a focus for the propaganda and politics of Francoist memory, legitimising 
the regime’s existence and its decisions.35 In this way, a “culture of war” would spread that 
considered the fight to be unfinished, at least implicitly, and that Spain should complete its 
resurgence by purging its weakened body by means of sacrifice and isolation. Furthermore, 
this is where the adoption of an autarchical economic, cultural and political programme would 
fit in. An interventionist policy was implemented by which the country renounced all imports 
and any international contact, it closed the doors n pernicious external economic and cultural 
influences and looked inwards; after all, its borders contained not only all the economic and 
natural resources that would allow the nation to become great, but also all the “spiritual 
resources” that had once made it an empire.36 
Spain had to return to its roots, to the “eternal essence” that had once made it great. It 
had to close in on itself, looking to the countryside, “Spain’s eternal breeding ground”.37 
Responding to its agrarian social origins, the “New State” filled its discourses and 
proclamations with extensive references to the Spanish countryside, praising its virtues and 
the peasants who lived there.38 The countryside and especially the lands of Castile were 
identified as all that was truly Spanish, with the purity, Christian faith and courage that 
characterised the Hispanic race. This was the salvation when confronted with the cities, those 
sites of Republican evil, dens of Marxism, liberalism, atheism and anarchy. As a result, an 
agrarian policy was imposed in order to guarantee that the urban evils would be cleansed, 
nourishing “the Spanish resurgence with sap”. This would be the explanation for the extreme 
protection of and intervention in prices and production in the forties: it was nothing more than 
                                                
35 Paloma Aguilar, Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Alianza, 1996), 57. 
36 Michael Richards, A Time of Silence. Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936-1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael Richards, ‘From War Culture to Civil Society. 
Francoism, Social Change and Memories of the Spanish Civil War’, History and Memory, 22 (2002), 93-120. 
37 Point 17 of the Unificación de Partidos (Unification of Parties) Decree, 19 April 1937, Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 20 April 1937. 
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a way of halting the city’s profit-making and setting a limit on the hidden interests of private 
capital.39  
In everyday life after the war, the “New State” would keep alive the spirit of the Civil 
War, bringing about a true “culture of victory”. However, this would not be a culture merely 
imposed “from above.” After all, it is in the local sphere that it was received, and indeed 
formed, allowing Francoism’s followers to participate in its constitution and feel part of that 
“community of victors.” 
The symbols and rites that would constitute Francoism’s official culture had already 
appeared during the conflict; over the course of the forties, they would come to dominate 
everyday life.40 These highlighted the existence of an exclusive natio l community, 
emotionally linked to the postulates of national regeneration, the rejection of the past 
democratic-Republican experience and the exaltation of traditional Catholic values. This 
became evident, for example, in the ritualised celebrations and commemorations of the rebel 
military victories during the Civil War, where the political combined with the religious. For 
example, the recollections of the military uprising a ainst the Second Republic regime, held 
in 1937, 1938 and 1939 throughout the Andalusian rebel rearguard, turned into episodes of 
fervent communion, exalting a new era and a new state.41 The Falangist militias’ street 
parades were attended by crowds of people who professed their religious faith and nationalist 
ardour. At all of them, the sacralised forms of theCatholic cult united with the symbols of a 
new secular religion that joyfully worshipped the Liberated Nation and blessed the 
providential return of the One Fatherland’s imperial and Catholic splendour.42 At many of 
these expressions of unconditional adhesion to the incipient Francoist state’s principles, the 
populace participated in a sort of celebration loaded with aesthetic, liturgical, mystical and 
almost sacred components. 
                                                                                                                                              
38 Example: Federico de Urrutia, ‘¡Arriba el campo!’, in Poemas de la Falange Eterna (Editora Nacional, 1938), 
46-9. Also: Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán, La evolución del campesinado en España (B rcelona: Península, 1979), 
143-53. 
39 Evidence for this can be found in some of Francisco Franco’s statements in those years: ‘Vivir cara al campo’, 
27 May 1950; and ‘Castilla, vivero de España’, 2 March 1950, in Textos de doctrina política. Palabras y escritos 
de 1945 a 1950 (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1951), 507 and 185. 
40 Rafael Cruz, ‘Old symbols, new meanings: mobilising the rebellion in the summer of 1936’, Chris Ealham nd 
Michael Richards, The Splintering, 159-76. 
41 Cf. Julián Casanova, La Iglesia de Franco, Barcelona, Crítica, 2005, 72-4. See also Giuliana di Febo, Ritos de 
guerra y de victoria en la España franquista, Bilbao, Desclée de Brouwer, 2002,  154-5. 
42 On 18 July 1937, well-attended civic-military-religious events were held in the largest towns and cities of 
Nationalist Andalusia; almost all of them were the scene for a common pattern of commemorative events tha  
attracted crowds of people. Cf. ABC de Sevilla, “Toda la España Liberada por el heroico esfuerzo del Ejército 
celebra con brillantes actos la fecha 18 de julio”, 20-8-1937. 
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 From this point of view, it is easier to understand the vigorous drama of the so-called 
“campaign mass.” These masses were set in open public spaces, dominated by monumental 
stages showing insignias and emblems alluding to the fusion between “the cross and the 
sword” and given a moving sensory and emotive theatricality. This is, at least, what can be 
gathered from the many bombastic celebrations of the “3rd Triumphal Year” held on 18 July 
1938 both in the city of Seville43 and in the main population centres and provincial capitals of 
“nationalist” Andalusia.44 The culmination was the ostentatious commemoration of the rebel 
army’s victory in the Civil War that took place in Seville on 17 April 1939 in the presence of 
Generalisimo Franco and General Queipo de Llano, with around 60,000 uniformed men and 
more than 300,000 people attending.45 
The symbols that made up the “culture of victory” were also forged at these events. 
These would provide a communication channel by which the population would express their 
adhesion to the “New State”, while participating in its symbolic construction. Thus, the 
monarchical flag was adopted as the national flag and r ised over official buildings after a 
place was conquered. On 15 August 1936, in the city of Granada, the population participated 
in a ceremony at the Cathedral: the ‘fervent crowd’ ent there to salute the flag solemnly to 
the sound of applause and shouts of “Viva España”.46 The flag was also used in other 
important ceremonies. In the village of Cogollos (Granada), the bereaved used it to cover the 
coffins of their “martyrs” during the Civil War, while the villagers saluted with the Roman 
salute during the funeral.47 In later years, the flag presided over official, popular and religious 
festivals, adorning the streets and squares of towns and cities. Many of their inhabitants would 
hang it from their balconies and windows, bearing witness to their support –or perhaps fear– 
of the Francoist regime and making it part of the day-to-day scenery in those years. 
The war meant the return of the national anthem (Marcha de Granaderos), as well as 
the use of other, secondary anthems (the Falangist Cara al Sol, the Carlist Oriamendi, the 
Spanish Legion’s anthem, etc.)48  These were insistently present at official ceremonies, 
processions and religious events, showing that the “tru  Spain” was inseparable from the 
                                                
43 Cf. Concha Langa Nuño, Educación y propaganda en la Sevilla de la Guerra Civil , Seville, Biblioteca de 
Temas Sevillanos, 2001, 51-2. 
44 Cf. ABC de Sevilla, “España, redimida por Franco, vibró ayer de fervores patrióticos al conmemorar el 18 de 
julio”, 19-71938. Ideal, “Granada celebra con gran esplendor el Día del Alzamiento” , 19-7-1938 and Cándido 
Ortiz de Villanos, Crónica de Granada en 1938; II-III Año Triunfal, Granada, Imprenta Urania, 1938, 145-6. 
45 Cf. Ideal, “Unas trescientas mil almas en plena exaltación patriótica” , 18-4-1939. 
46 Claudio Hernández Burgos, La construcción de la Cultura de la Victoria en Granada, 1936-1951, Memoria de 
Licenciatura Inédita, (Granada: Universidad de Granad , 2009), 104. 
47 Ideal, “Numeroso público asistió al entierro de los falangistas muertos heroicamente en Cogollos”, 26-1-1937. 
48 A good example of this variety and of its meaning for one of the regime’s ideologists in: Ernesto Giménez 
Caballero, La infantería española (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular, 1941), 67-79. 
COBO ROMERO, Francisco, DEL ARCO BLANCO, Miguel Ángel y ORTEGA LÓPEZ, 
Teresa, “The Stability and Consolidation of the Francoist Regime. The case of Eastern 
Andalusia, 1936-50”, Contemporary European History, 20, 1, 2011, pp. 37-59. 
 14
Catholic religion. In Granada, for instance, a loca newspaper stated “the populace stand and 
sing [all the anthems] together, with the same enthusiasm, because all sing to the great, noble, 
just and strong Fatherland, to which they have consecrated their effort and their lives.”49 The 
use of war anthems was extended into the “years of peace”, paying homage to the martyrs of 
the “Crusade” in their lyrics and indicating that those who remained alive and in charge of the 
institutions were continuing to combat the enemy, lining up with their fallen companions, 
who stood “guardia sobre los luceros” (“guard over the stars”).50 
 It was necessary to recover Catholicism and its Baroque and counter-Reformation 
spirit, the traces of the true Hispanic tradition and elements that could purify the “Fatherland’s 
sins”.51 Already during the war, acts of desagravio (amends or reparation) took place and 
masses were held at the front and in the rearguard; processions and pilgrimages occurred and, 
of course, crucifixes were returned to schools and public buildings. Religion and God, 
identified with Nationalist Spain, were returned to their place, making them present in 
everyday life during the post-war period. Not even condemned Republicans could escape 
these symbols: in January 1937, an event was held to replace the crucifix in Granada Prison, 
with a number of political prisoners lined up in the courtyard to listen to the head of the 
institution’s triumphalist speech.52 In towns and cities, masses set the rhythms of daily life: 
attending Sunday mass became an act of support for the egime and, for some, a way of 
avoiding reprisals or being marked politically. Parish priests and clergymen became judges of 
the moral, religious and political conduct of the parishioners.53 With the notion that Spain’s 
“purification” was only possible through penitence, a great many religious celebrations were 
held during the war and postwar period at which the political and the religious went hand in 
hand. These became acts in which the population partici ted, showing their Christian faith 
and patriotism. All these manifestations fitted in with the desire expressed by both the 
Catholic Church and the Francoist “New State” to remove the deep roots of secularism and 
atheist materialism fostered by the Second Republic. In this way, Spanish society was re-
Catholicised, occupying public spaces in towns and cities, while Francoism’s supporters were 
offered an opportunity to participate and show their adhesion and belonging to this “culture of 
victory”. These supporters used gestures to combine the religious and the political in ways 
                                                
49 Ideal, 17-9-1936. 
50 ‘Cara al Sol’, Anthem of the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS. 
51 Giuliana Di Febo, Ritos de guerra y de victoria en la España franquista (Bilbao: DDB, 2002), 27-38. 
52 Ideal, 19 January 1937. 
53 Conxita Mir, Vivir es sobrevivir. Justicia, orden y marginación e la Cataluña rural de posguerra (Lleida, 
Milenio, 2000), 189-237; Ramón García Piñeiro, ‘Boina, bonete y tricornio. Instrumentos de control campesino 
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that reflected the identification between the two lying at the very heart of the crusade.54 
Particularly noteworthy are the missionary campaigns carried out in remote rural areas, the 
dramatised mass missions in large population centres and the group celebrations of 
christenings or Catholic weddings held to make amends for the damage suffered by the 
Church due to the application of the Republican period’s secular and anti-religious legislation. 
Most of these ritualised representations intended to stage the return of the values and beliefs 
of that traditional, essentialist and anti-modern religiosity upon which large parts of the 
middle classes and the oligarchies had been building their particular status. Of this frenzied 
anxiousness to re-Catholicise, an important element was the consecration of many towns and 
cities to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, with a clearly expiatory aim. Some of these consecrations 
became tremendous manifestations of the crowd’s Catholic fervour, as shown by the fact that, 
in June 1945, the town of Guadix (Granada province) took in an impressive throng of 50,000 
people who crowded around the cathedral, which was crowned by a majestic image of 
Christ.55   
 However, the most intense public liturgies were certainly the ones that formed a glorious 
climax to the re-Catholicisation of the 1940s, the two Great Popular Missions held in the cities 
of Jaen and Granada. The Holy Mission in Jaen took place between 18 February and 9 March 
1947. This involved the participation of a total of 26 Redemptorist missionaries and members of 
the order of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, presided over by Bishop García y García de Castro. 
During the event, the priests, distributed in numerous places of worship, preached to the 
different guilds, trades and corporations of the city, to representatives of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and to workers in general (bricklayers, carpenters, railway workers, 
peasants, mechanics, etc.). The Holy Mission ended with two grand, crowded events: the 
Stations of the Cross on 26 February that came out in the Plaza de Santa María, in front of the 
cathedral, ending with a huge gathering of more than 40,000 of the faithful; and the concluding 
masses held on Sunday 2 March, at which more than 15,000 communions were given.56  
The Holy Mission in Granada took place from the 16 to 30 October 1949, and during the 
event 103 missionaries from all over Spain took part. Both daytime and night-time religious 
events were held in all of the city’s churches and improvised spaces, and conferences intended 
for all sections of society were run. So that the “missionary’s voice would reach to the last 
house and the most remote and secluded corner,” the majority of the churches and religious 
buildings were installed with exterior loudspeakers: and even the busiest streets and squares of 
                                                
54 Mary Vincent, ‘Expiation as Performative Rhetoric in National-Catholicism: The Politics of Gesture in Post-
Civil War Spain’, Past and Present, 203 (2009), 240. 
55 Cf. Claudio Hernández Burgos, La construcción de la Cultura, 149-50 and Patria, 6 June 1945. 
56 Cf. Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Obispado de Jaén, Marzo de 1947; Ideal, Edición Jaén, 12-2-1947 and 4-
3-1947. 
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the city centre (Puerta Real, el Embovedado, Plaza del Campillo, Plaza de la Mariana, Plaza 
Bib-Rambla, Calle San Matías and Calle Navas) were provided with giant loudspeakers, 
broadcasting the speeches that Archbishop Balbino Santos y Olivera was giving on Radio 
Granada. At the end of each day, a general gathering of missionaries and parishioners took 
place in el Embovedado, an iconic location where an altar with a foliage cross, five metres high 
and two metres wide, was erected. After two weeks of hectic liturgical activity, the triumphant 
balance sheet drawn up by the Granadan church documenting the scope of the “Great Mission” 
was the following: attendance of children: 2,000; attendance of adults: 40,000 to 50,000; 
average attendance at each of the general gatherings: 70,000 to 80,000 of the faithful; 
communions given during the mission: 120,000; overall number of people participating in the 
mission: 85,000; illicit matrimonial unions canonised: 544.57  
These devotional and patriotic ceremonies were directly related to memories of the 
Civil War. For this reason, the regime took care to occupy the spaces with symbols and rites 
closely linked to memory of the conflict. The Civil War occupied the streets and squares: the 
changing of names began very early on, erasing any trace of the Republican period and 
putting in place new myths and heroes of the “anti-Spain’s” defeat. For example, in February 
1937, shortly after taking the city of Malaga, the Francoist authorities announced that names 
would be substituted, removing indications of those “m n who were revolting because of the 
poison of their ideas; because of the cruelty and ferocity of their instincts; because of the ruin 
they brought upon our Fatherland”, in this way cleansing any trace, even the names, of this 
“false Spain”.58 
Remembrance of the war’s martyrs and heroes became a central element of the post-
war liturgy. These men would be the ideal models for the new regime: an example of 
masculinity, courage, heroism, purity, faith and sacrifice. They had fertilised the future of the 
“New Spain” with their blood.59 They should not be forgotten and they were to be present in 
the victors’ imaginary. A good example of this is their presence in the public sphere, with 
their names being given to the new streets and roads f the resurgent Fatherland. Now, victors 
and vanquished would live in and travel through streets with the names of the victors. This 
was not merely the case for exalted and far-off names like José Antonio Primo de Rivera or 
                                                
57 Cf. Crónica de la Santa Misión General de Granada, Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de 
Granada, Número Extraordinario, January 1950, 111-2. 
58 Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Ministerio del Interior. Box 3910, 20-2-1937. 
59 Mary Vincent, ‘The Martyrs and the Saints: masculinity and the construction of the Francoist Crusade’, 
History Workshop Journal, 44 (1999), 68-98. 
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Francisco Franco, but also provincial and even local heroes. In the town of Santa Fe (Granada 
province), next to a street bearing the name of José Antonio we find others with the names of 
the two soldiers who led the coup in the nearby provincial capital, and two more streets 
dedicated to inhabitants of the town itself.60 The Civil War and its memory “made equal” 
those who fought and gave their blood for Spain, perpetuating their memory and binding the 
community of the victorious. 
Crosses were erected in honour of the fallen in every town and city. They occupied the 
most important places, bearing the names of those who had “fallen for God and Spain”. The 
crosses linked past, present and future: they placed th  living and the dead on the same 
temporal plane; like other European nations during the interwar period, the nation was not 
only made up of those alive at that time, but also previous generations, those who had died, 
and future generations, those who were yet to come and who were to ensure the eternity of the 
“Fatherland”.61 On many occasions, their construction was promoted by those who identified 
themselves with the victorious group and by those who spontaneously undertook popular 
subscriptions to honour the memory of their relatives.62 The crosses to the fallen dominated 
local life, occupying the main streets or squares. One example is that of Montefrío (Granada 
province), whose council agreed in 1943 to raise theirs on the hill overlooking the place, so 
that it could be “visible from everywhere in the town”.63 The reminder of the Civil War cast 
its shadow over the lives of all the residents. 
On a great many occasions, their inauguration becam n act of desagravio and 
support. For example, the inauguration of the Cross f r the Fallen in Alcalá la Real (Jaen 
province) in 1941 was preceded by a mass-funeral in the important abbey church of Santa 
María la Mayor. This was attended by the town’s “living forces”, relatives of martyrs, ex-
combatants, those persecuted or imprisoned by the Republican authorities and all fervent 
supporters of Francoism: the “community of victory”. After the service, carried out by the 
vicar-general of the diocese, all those present filed out and met before the monument; here 
                                                
60 Archivo Histórico Municipal de Santa Fe (AHMSF), 273 Libro de Actas of the Comisión Gestora, 17-4-1937, 
14 April 1937 and 31 March 1937. 
61 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 49. 
62 José Luis Ledesma Vera and Javier Rodrigo, ‘Caídos por España, mártires de la libertad: víctimas y 
conmemoración de la Guerra Civil en la España postbélica (1936-2006)’, Ayer, 63 (2006), 244. 
63 Example: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Montefrío (AHMM), Libro de Actas of the Ayuntamiento of 
Montefrío (1941-1945), Comisión Gestora 10 April 1943. 
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there were speeches, flags were raised, anthems were sung and the spirit of the “Crusade” was 
revived once again.64 
Like other interwar Fascist regimes, Francoism reord red time to legitimise and 
perpetuate itself.65 Even here, the long shadow of the Civil War was extended, with the 
reorganisation of the calendar to perpetuate and celebrate remembrance of the conflict. It 
would be impossible to escape reminders of the victory, those meanings that distilled the 
victors’ shared culture in each discourse, ceremony and newspaper item. Popular and secular 
festivals were abolished. Religious festivals and oes linked to the Francoist regime were 
imposed: National Catholicism was established in the public sphere, creating a space for and 
transmitting its ideology … but it also penetrated into the private sphere, into families and 
into individuals’ faith, beliefs and morals.66  
Political and religious commemorations suffocated the lives of Spaniards: the 
anniversary of the Glorious National Uprising, “Victory” day, the death of El Ausente (the 
Absent One), the Caudillo’s saint’s day, commemorati n of St Theresa … In parallel to this, 
local religious festivals were spectacularly revitalised. All these involved the remembrance of 
those who had died in the conflict as well as the attacks on ecclesiastical images during the 
Republican period and the Civil War. As in Christian tradition, it had been necessary to 
sacrifice some of their sons to save Spain and ensur  a new order. In Malaga, for example, 
these religious manifestations were presented as a way of purifying the streets, the bodies and 
the minds of Spaniards. In this way, the myths and the spirit of the Civil War were 
perpetuated, making them part of the language, memory and symbology of post-war Spain, 
perpetuating the division into victors and vanquished.67 
The nineteen-forties were marked by this “culture of victory”, exemplified by rites, 
symbols, festivals and celebrations. Like Fascist Italy, the rites became integral elements of 
society, which, participating in their representation and in their confirmation, felt identified 
with the regime that carried them out.68 In fact, these “victory rites” gave shape to an 
                                                
64 Diario Jaén, ‘Inauguración del monumento a los caídos en Alcalá la Real’, 16 September 1941.  
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integrated community of victors that was separate from those who had lost the war.69 The 
“New State’s” various forces and social supports were present at these ceremonies, thus 
creating an imagined community identified as the “true Spain”, which awaited “justice” 
against the abominable Republican enemies, contaminated beings who were remote from God 
and pernicious to the Fatherland’s health and future.  
 
The time of “Justice”: repression and destruction of the enemy 
 
The thick sediment of cultural, allegorical, liturgical and discursive components that 
we have set out conferred stability on the Francoist regime. However, its importance does not 
only reside in this, but also in its interaction with society, as well as its spread and 
consequences over time. It was to be a liquid layer, overlapping with and giving meaning to 
the other two areas that allowed the “New State” to survive: repression and socioeconomic 
interests. Some towns in Eastern Andalusian offer us a perfect framework for observing this 
interaction, revealing the links between culture and reality, but also between local and 
national politics. 
We cannot understand Francoism without repression, a true pillar of the “New 
State”.70 The machinery of terror and annihilation was essential for the paralysis and 
elimination of possible opponents: extra-judicial killings, military trials, the Ley de 
Responsabilidades Políticas (Political Responsibilities Law), exile, prison, concentration 
camps… The violence was so brutal that in 1999 a study estimated that Francoist repression, 
including the Civil War and post-war periods, claimed a startling 150,000 victims. Even today 
new local studies are appearing, increasing this figure and rescuing the names of those who 
disappeared.71 
In interwar authoritarian regimes, repression and violence were not simply imposed 
from above: in Nazi Germany, the civil population played an active role in the tasks of 
policing, control and repression, participating and collaborating “from below” by means of 
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denunciations, reports and testimony.72 In the Spanish case, recent studies have shown the 
decisive and enthusiastic participation of the population in the annihilation and punishment of 
the Republicans. By analysing military trials in the Andalusian district of Los Pedroches, 
Peter Anderson has shown that on 70 percent of occasions the proceedings began on the 
initiative of members of civil society who, keen toobtain “Franco’s justice” and fair 
retribution for the death of family members, were quick to denounce their neighbours. Their 
denunciations and statements show a view of the Republican enemy as monstrous and 
unnatural, the Civil War as a unique event and the punishment and annihilation of the 
vanquished as the reward expected from Franco’s regime. 73 
The application of the Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas created similar tendencies. 
As is known, this measure went beyond the mere physical punishment of the vanquished: as 
well as imposing death penalties and prison sentences, the courts decreed the confiscation of 
the accused’s property, in this way making the future difficult for that person’s family.74 With 
the head of the family dead or in prison and his prope ty confiscated, his family members 
would be plunged into poverty, another corridor in Francoism’s maze of repression. In fact, 
the highest authorities in Andalusian towns did not hesitate to publish reports regarding the 
political activities and ideas of the accused, making use of residents’ collaborative efforts to 
this end. Mayors, local Falange heads, Civil Guard officers, parish priests and even military 
commanders wrote an enormous number of reports, filling them with the official language 
and values which presented the Republican enemy as a subhuman, cruel and barbarous being. 
For example, in the file of the Socialist day labourer José María Arco Soto, of Montefrío 
(Granada province), all the authorities gave evidence against him. According to the local 
Falange head, “during the period of red domination, he was the leader of the hordes”; the 
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Civil Guard said that “under Marxist rule he committed all kinds of outrages”; and the mayor 
stated that this “enthusiastic propagandist and perpetrator of Soviet ideas” opposed the 
“Glorious Uprising” with the “aim of achieving the installation of a Marxist regime”.75 Arco 
Soto was taken to the Provincial Prison in Granada. However, in 1945 repression was still 
underway. Even then, some residents of the town continued to commit themselves to 
repression: together with the reports of the authorities and inspectors appointed for that 
purpose, two residents stated that he had no property.76 
The participation of a section of society in repression went beyond denunciations and 
statements. Some would even form part of the machinery ensuring residents were stripped of 
their property, participating in the process of confiscation. The judge would appoint an 
inspector from among the inhabitants of a place to carry out the appropriate investigations, 
asking for information from banks and land registry offices, speaking to neighbours, etc.77 
This arduous task meant an obvious political commitent to Francoism: these men would 
visit the houses of relations, making an inventory f items of value, contemplating the 
terrified faces of the Republican families. Supporters of common values and ideas, they did 
not hesitate to participate in the punishment they considered just and appropriate for the 
annihilation of a “subhuman Republican enemy”. In the town of Montefrío, of the 28 
complete files analysed, we find no less than 20 different inspectors; some of them even lent 
their services to different proceedings.78 Both right-wing inspectors and technicians, marked 
by the experience of the war and repositories of that “culture of victory”, did not hesitate to 
participate in the processes that dispossessed families with a Republican or socialist tradition 
of their property. For instance, Alfonso Pérez García acted as an inspector in various actions 
against his neighbours. Farmer and small property owner, he was monarchical councillor for 
Acción Popular (Popular Action) and head of the Catholic trade union in the town during the 
Second Republic. At 38, after the uprising, he was arrested by the Republicans; nonetheless, 
he managed to escape and fled to the rebel area, where he joined the Falange and took up the 
position of councillor in one of the “New State’s” first town councils. By 1940 he was already 
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head of the Montefrío Hermandad de Labradores (Brothe hood of Farmworkers), the 
agricultural trade union of the Francoist regime.79  
The division between victors and vanquished became evident. The socioeconomic 
profile of the accused fitted with that of the Republicans, who belonged to the lower and 
lower-middle classes: of the 28 defendants, only 10 of them had any kind of property and 
these people had only small or very small properties.80 On the other hand, the inspectors 
belonged to the modest and heterogeneous middle classes: 18 out of 20 of them would have 
urban or rural property.81 
It is clear that Francoism’s social supports participated in the regime’s values and 
beliefs, and also the morality that this regime advocated. In this way, many people’s 
behaviour was conditioned by fear and coercion: in Franco’s Spain, too, there existed a “self-
policing society”.82 It was the very residents of Spanish towns and cities who became the 
censors of the ideas, attitudes and habits of theirfellow citizens. Francoism granted them the 
possibility of participating in social and moral control, watching over the country’s “health” 
and many did not hesitate to make the most of this opportunity. The fear of being denounced, 
of being singled out for negative treatment by the authorities, became something widespread 
and everyday: that time was the beginning of self-cnsorship, internal exile and, above all, 
silence. Francoism’s supporters thus became repositorie  of a disciplinary and sovereign 






                                                                                                                                              
78 We refer to 28 ‘expedientes de incautación de bienes’ (property confiscation files) deposited in the AGA, 
Justicia section, box 256. 
79 Archivo Histórico Provincial de Granada (AHPG), AISS, boxes 7197 and 7218. 
80 Some examples: AGA, Justicia. Comisión Provincial de Incautación de Bienes de Granada. Box 256, file o  
Antonio Blanco Ruiz, 24-10-1936; and file of Pedro Peregrina Mazuela, 14-12-1936. 
81 AGA, Justicia, box 256. Padrón of the inhabitants of Montefrío, 1922. Catastro de Rústica. Padrón de Urbana 
of 1940. 
82 We apply here the concept of Robert Gellately: Backing Hitler: consent and coercion in Nazi Germany, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. This idea has arisen in, among others: Óscar Rodríguez Barreira, 
‘“Cuando lleguen los amigos de Negrín…” Actitudes individuales y opinión pública ante la II Guerra Mundial 
en una provincia del Sur. Almería, 1939-1945’, Historia y Política. Ideas, procesos y movimientos s ciales, 18, 
(2007), 295-323. 
83 Michel Foucault, Hay que defender la sociedad, (Madrid: Akal, 2004), 206. 
COBO ROMERO, Francisco, DEL ARCO BLANCO, Miguel Ángel y ORTEGA LÓPEZ, 
Teresa, “The Stability and Consolidation of the Francoist Regime. The case of Eastern 
Andalusia, 1936-50”, Contemporary European History, 20, 1, 2011, pp. 37-59. 
 23
The political economy of “Franco’s Justice”: satisfying the interests of the 
victors and destroying the vanquished 
 
Participating and collaborating with the regime’s inst tutions, Francoism’s social 
supports would obtain their own “Justice” in material terms. In the context of the terrible 
economic crisis of the post-war period, they would see their private interests fulfilled, 
obtaining a just reward for their contribution to installing the regime and ensuring its 
permanence. In this sense, too, those who had lost the war would also face their neighbours, 
the victors, and suffer the terrible consequences of the political autarchy. 
There has been criticism of the irrationality of the autarchy’s economic model.84 These 
points of view, as well as failing to take into consideration the autarchical model’s cultural 
and political goals, have focussed their analyses on the economic results obtained by the 
Spanish economy as a whole, showing that certainly economic growth came to a halt and that 
economic crisis characterised the post-war years. However, a more careful local analysis 
shows the cultural and political coherence of the autarchical model: Francoism’s social bases 
avoided the poor economic conditions and, in some cases, progressed economically; on the 
other hand, the most disadvantaged classes came face to face with poverty.85 Meanwhile, the 
“culture of victory” legitimised and sanctioned the enrichment of those who had won the war. 
It justified the permissiveness of the authorities owards their fraudulent practices and, at the 
same time, it justified the punishment of the lowest, of those who were never part of the 
regime’s social bases, demanding from them the sacrifice necessary for the economic 
independence and redemption of Spain. 
The autarchy meant the adoption of a highly interventionist system. Suddenly, a 
regime that affirmed the continuity of the war provided its men with an unprecedented 
weapon: controlling their neighbours’ food supply. It would be these new men, a reflection of 
Francoism’s social bases, ex-combatants marked by the experience of the Civil War and 
imbued with the official culture of Francoism, who would control the work on, production, 
sale and distribution of food and products in each rea.86 The administration of rationing 
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cards, which lasted until 1952, was in their hands: the survival of their neighbours depended 
on their decisions.  
The regime’s social supports enjoyed the authorities’ indulgence. Perhaps the best 
example of this was the workings of the estraperlo or black market. According to an English 
traveller writing in 1946, the entire Spanish nation, rich and poor alike, was involved in the 
black market, yet the army, the authorities, the large Francoist bureaucracy and the regime’s 
social supports were not punished for this.87 Those who were caught out were almost always 
from the lowest classes. In Almeria province, almost 90 out of 100 of those charged belonged 
to the lowest classes: unemployed, day labourers, workers and a striking number of widows. 
86 out of 100 had no property or economic capacities at all.88 
Furthermore, Francoism’s social bases were better equipped to face the situation. The 
heterogeneous rural middle classes (small and mediu-s zed traders and industrialists, but 
above all small and large farmers and even landlords) had access to food resources and 
products, ensuring their survival through direct consumption or by means of a small black 
market tolerated by the authorities. It was even possible for some to enrich themselves 
spectacularly. The municipality of Santa Fe produce some surprising results. Between 1936 
and 1951, of the 27 administrators with agricultural interests, 12 of them became property 
owners or increased the size of their agricultural p operties (more than 44 percent), 12 held 
their properties intact (44.4 percent) and only the properties of three were reduced in size 
(11.11 percent).89 One example is the case of Fausto Rodríguez Rodríguez. In 1936, at 40 
years of age, he did not work his own land. After joining the Falange, fighting the Civil War, 
holding party positions (assistant local head in 1940, head of the Hermandad de Labradores 
from 1944 to 1960) and being a local councillor between 1944 and 1947, his prospects would 
improve remarkably. The defence of the “values of the Crusade” and his close adherence to 
the regime bore fruit: in 1945 he obtained property, a little more than 2 hectares, but in 1951 
he had over 12 hectares of agricultural land in Santa Fe alone.90 
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The socioeconomic repression provides evidence that the culture of victory and social 
realities went hand in hand. The Montefrío smallholder Alfonso Pérez García, referred to 
above, collaborated with the Tribunal of Responsabilidades Políticas, persecuting the town’s 
left-wing families. He shared that “culture of victory” and participated in a number of the 
regime’s local institutions. The socioeconomic results of his political loyalty are evident: 
owning just 0.15 hectares in 1936, in 1946 he farmed 3.72. He shared the values of the 
Francoist regime, but he also acted to repress the vanquished, thereby obtaining a reward.91   
Meanwhile, for the vanquished there was only hunger and misery: in short, 
socioeconomic repression. The lowest classes did not have productive resources. Many 
families had been destroyed by the execution of the head of the family as well as through the 
exile or imprisonment of family members. Away from the prisons and cemeteries, life went 
on: the families of those on the losing side had to av id hunger and it was necessary to 
struggle to survive. Great political dreams were forgotten, and replaced with a day-to-day 
fight that often involved breaking the laws of the day in order to cling to life, carrying out 
silent resistance that would mark the terrible years of the nineteen-forties.92 They resorted to 
the black market in order to survive, although the authorities, directed by the regime’s social 
supports, were a constant obstacle in this regard. While the great black market, of the large 
goods vans of wheat, went undetected, the “black market of the poor” was punished with 
fines which, if unpaid, would mean the accused were taken straight to labour camps.93 
Repression also occurred outside the prisons: the very legal system was a weapon ready to be 
used against the weakest.94 However, the constant fight against legality would a leviate the 
conditions of the most underprivileged, as well as involving silent resistance and protest 
which shows that those who remained outside the community of victory were also present.95 
The extreme economic situation would condition post-war life. Dying of hunger would 
become a sad possibility for some. The perpetuation of the regime also worked in this way: 
not only because, as we have seen, it undermined the majority’s dreams of redemption, but 
also because Francoism took advantage of this situation. The regime’s social policy was 
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aimed at creating support: institutions like Auxilio Social (Social Aid) were intended to attract 
the population, of course attempting to instil the regime’s ideology in those who received aid, 
but also offering paternalist services that would make the difficult post-war conditions 
lighter.96 In Almeria, the Frente de Juventudes (Youth Front) also carried out this role of 
assistance, and perhaps for this reason it is not surpri ing that the majority of its militants 
belonged to the lowest classes or were children of those on the losing side of the Civil War.97 
Francoism was not averse to carrying out a social or ideological policy in order to integrate 
and recruit the masses.98 Recent research into Seville province seems to indicate that 
sometimes the regime was successful: we should not ignore the Falangist programme’s 
powers of integration, as shown by the large number of Falange members belonging to the 
lowest classes.99 However, what is certain is that the “discourse of victory”, designed to 
exclude and differentiate, made the integration of the vanquished a complicated matter.  
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During the interwar period, the Western world was shaken by a profound economic, 
political and cultural crisis. In a context in whic the old liberal order suffered from general 
discredit and the emergence of new political formulas for exalting the Nation, conceived as a 
live body, and one necessarily provided with a profound cohesion. In this new context, the 
Fascists turned the traditional forms of political experience around, contributing to the 
creation of scepticism towards democracy and traditional liberalism’s elites, designated as 
“decrepit” and “ineffective”. Fascism had arisen as a movement of political action profoundly 
imbued with a forceful rejection of the representative and parliamentary system of pre-war 
liberalism. The Fascists called for a reconceptualisation of the Nation, now understood as a 
vital community possessing a memorable shared past, and frequently revealed through a 
copious relation of myths, fables, allegories and symbols. 
The rise and installation of Francoism was no exception. Franco’s regime was a 
product of a civil war that involved the crystallisation of an ideology uniting both previously-
existing and new cultural components with a Fascist or intensely Fascistised origin. In the 
rearguard and on the front line, a “culture of victory” would be created that, not without 
difficultly, would grant unity to the rebel group. This culture was not only imposed from 
above, but it also arose due to a combination of existing traditions and new situations. At that 
time, mythical and regenerative elements arose that made it possible to see the “Crusade” as 
the decisive moment when the “true Spain” would rise from its ashes. These visions were 
embraced by heterogeneous groups on the right wing and by the varied range of social classes 
who fought to end the Republic. In the clamour of battle, the culture would become an 
element uniting the victors. 
The Civil War ended. Yet Franco’s regime advocated the perpetuation of its memory 
and non-reconciliation: thus the forties became a continuation of this culture of war, of this 
culture of victory which was a constant reminder of b th the “Crusade’s” validity and an idea 
of Spain that discriminated between victors and vanquished. The “community of victory” and 
its values would remain alive in the post-war period, integrating and giving strength to 
Francoism’s political project.  
As some of the local examples given in this article show, the “culture of victory” 
conditioned the lives, perceptions and actions of Francoism’s supporters, making it possible 
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for the community of victors and the regime itself to interact. This is an explanation for the 
direct involvement of many men and women in the work of repression, control and policing 
of the so-called “enemies of Spain”. It would also explain the participation that the regime’s 
social supports were ready to provide in different fields. Through these institutions, the 
management of power would follow the same logic of the “culture of victory”: the victors 
would negotiate the difficult post-war conditions and even obtain tempting benefits; 
meanwhile, the vanquished, the lowest classes, would live trapped by poverty and hunger, a 
continuation of the repressive maze in which they would find themselves in Franco’s Spain.  
The “culture of victory”, constructed on mythical approaches that arose during the 
Civil War, became an essential element  –although not the only one– used by the regime in its 
search for stability and a long life. Francoism’s social supports, those heterogeneous middle 
classes that actively participated in the movement’s birth during the Civil War and in its 
continuity during the post-war period, extracted from those mythical approaches a “corpus” of 
ideas and values in which to believe. It was this culture that helped them to interpret the 
convulsed world in which they lived as a reality that was in need of profound regeneration, 




Map 1. Eastern Andalusia: the provinces of Malaga, Jaen, Granada and Almeria 
 
